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Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies, such
as tit-for-tat, that depend on remembering a partner’s last choices. Yet, an empirical
study by Stevens et al. (2011) demonstrated that human memory may not meet the
requirements that needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous
behavior of simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed
poorly, making errors in 10–24% of the trials. However, we do not know the extent to
which this task taps specialized cognition for cooperation. It may be possible to engage
participants in more cooperative, strategic thinking, which may improve memory. On
the other hand, compared with other situations, a cooperative context may already
engage improved memory via cheater detection mechanisms. This study investigated
the specificity of memory in cooperative contexts by varying (1) the costs of errors in
memory by making forgetting defection more costly and (2) whether the recall situation
is framed as a cooperative or neutral context. Also, we investigated whether variation
in participants’ social network size could account for individual differences observed
in memory accuracy. We found that neither including differential costs for misremembering defection nor removing the cooperative context influenced memory accuracy
for cooperation. Combined, these results suggest that memory accuracy is robust
to differences in the cooperative context: Adding more strategic components does
not help accuracy, and removing cooperative components does not hurt accuracy.
Social network size, however, did correlate with memory accuracy: People with larger
networks remembered the events better. These findings suggest that cooperative
memory does not seem to be special compared with other forms of memory, which
aligns with previous work demonstrating the domain generality of memory. However,
the demands of interacting in a large social network may require excellent memory.
Thus, modeling the evolution of cooperation requires an understanding of both the
social environment in which agents interact and the cognitive capabilities of these
agents.
Keywords: cooperation, forgetting, memory, prisoner’s dilemma, social network, tit-for-tat
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1. INTRODUCTION

when TFT strategists forget their partner’s actions and make
errors in their choices, cooperation degrades into defection
(Molander, 1985). The detrimental effect of memory errors on
TFT’s performance has inspired the development of alternative
strategies that are more robust to memory errors. For instance,
tit-for-two-tats (TF2T) allow two defections from the partner
before resorting to retaliatory defection (Axelrod, 1980b).
Generous tit-for-tat (GTFT) forgives a single defection with a
certain probability (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). Contrite tit-fortat (CTFT) recognizes its own mistaken defection and corrects
with cooperation (Boyd and Richerson, 1989).
Despite this theoretical interest in the effect of memory errors
on reciprocal strategies (Molander, 1985; Stephens et al., 1995;
Wu and Axelrod, 1995; Rieskamp and Todd, 2006), the memory
error rates were not grounded in any kind of empirical data on
forgetting. To estimate empirical memory error rates, Stevens
et al. (2011) measured human forgetting rates in a cooperative
memory task. In this task, participants viewed actions (cooperate
or not cooperate) chosen by a set of simulated partners. After
viewing all partners once, they then encountered each partner
again in a random order, and they were asked to recall whether
that partner cooperated or not. Then, the partner’s next action
was presented (each action was randomly chosen with equal
probability). Participants experienced multiple rounds of these
encounters with their partners. Stevens et al. (2011) varied the
number of rounds and the number of partners between participants. In the various conditions, participants made errors in
10–24% of the trials. Moreover, error rates increased with more
intervening events (number of interactions with other partners
between two consecutive interactions with a particular partner).
Computer simulations suggested that these error rates would
likely preclude the evolution of cooperation (Stevens et al., 2011).
It is important to highlight that this study aimed to test the cognitive capacities need for TFT specifically rather than cooperation
generally.

Upon entering a bar or restaurant in your home town, you might
recognize a friend and purchase a drink for him or her. Yet, when
on a layover in an airport far from home, you likely would not
join with a stranger and buy a drink for him or her. Why pay
a cost to help a friend but not a stranger? More generally, why
do we cooperate in some situations but not others? You would
likely not continue to cooperate if your friend always expected
you to pay for his or her drink. Unilateral cooperation allows
cheating by defectors (those who do not cooperate). In evolutionary terms, a population of cooperators would not resist invasion
from defectors. Therefore, cooperation must be conditional. It
can be conditional on relatedness to your partner (kin selection:
Hamilton, 1964), costs imposed on defection (punishment: Boyd
and Richerson, 1992), observations from other potential partners
(reputation/indirect reciprocity: Boyd and Richerson, 1989), or
rates of group fission and extinction (group selection: Traulsen
and Nowak, 2006).
In the friend/stranger example, cooperation depends on
the likelihood of your partner reciprocating in the future. Such
reciprocal altruism or direct reciprocity can allow cooperation to
evolve because the costs of cooperating can be recouped in the
future, when your partner cooperates in return (Trivers, 1971).
The likelihood of a stranger in an airport buying a drink in return
is much lower than that of a friend in your home town.
The notion of reciprocity has been formalized as a decision
strategy called tit-for-tat (TFT). The TFT strategy cooperates
in the first interaction with a partner and, for all subsequent
interactions, copies the partner’s action in the previous interaction (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Computer simulations
have shown that TFT outcompetes other strategies in a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma, a game that captures the dilemma between
the selfish advantage of defection and the group advantage of
cooperation (Axelrod, 1980a). Analytical work has demonstrated
that TFT is not invadable by always defecting (ALLD) if the
probability of future encounters is high (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981). Therefore, with repeated future interactions, reciprocity
can maintain cooperation.

1.2. Domain Specificity of Cooperative
Memory

Stevens et al. (2011) provided the first empirical estimates of forgetting rates for cooperative events. But they did not address whether
cooperative memory is “special,” i.e., it remains unclear whether
cooperative contexts tap specialized, domain-specific cognitive
mechanisms that have evolved to deal with the important adaptive problems of cheater detection (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989).
Memory, in particular, seems to be adapted to solve key information processing problems (Bjork and Bjork, 1988; Anderson and
Schooler, 1991; Schacter, 1999; Nairne and Pandeirada, 2016).
For example, work on “survival memory” indicates that people
have better memory for items when primed to think about fitnessrelevant contexts compared to fitness-irrelevant contexts (Nairne
et al., 2007; Nairne and Pandeirada, 2016). Some have suggested
that memory may be enhanced in cooperative situations, as well.
Early work in this area showed that people had better recognition memory for cheaters compared with cooperators (Mealey
et al., 1996). Subsequent work correcting for biases, however, has

1.1. Cognitive Building Blocks

TFT has generated a great deal of theoretical and empirical interest because of its simplicity and intuitive nature. It has become
the default model of direct reciprocity (Nowak, 2006). Though
being simple and intuitive are desirable characteristics of models,
they do not necessarily mean that the models represent how
humans or other animals actually make decisions.
Simon (1955) admonished that understanding decision making requires integrating the organism’s cognitive capacities into
the models. Until recently, researchers had not explored whether
TFT was cognitively feasible or whether psychological constraints
may prevent implementing it (Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens and
Hauser, 2004).
One key cognitive building block for TFT is memory. Because
TFT strategists copy their partner’s previous action, they must
store that action in memory. Theoretical work has shown that,

Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org

2

October 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 52

Winke and Stevens

Is Cooperative Memory Special?

1.3. Memory and Social Networks

failed to show better recognition memory for cheaters (Barclay,
2008; Volstorf et al., 2011; Bell and Buchner, 2012). Yet, people
do have better source memory for cheaters. Cheaters are better
remembered when they are smiling or viewed as likeable compared with when they are angry or viewed as unlikeable (Bell
et al., 2012a). Thus, certain aspects of the decision context (e.g.,
emotional incongruency) can enhance memory for cheaters (Bell
and Buchner, 2012).
Most work on cooperative memory has focused on whether
people preferentially remember one action (cooperate or defect)
or one reputation type (cooperator or defector). Although
researchers have explored how memory for cooperative reputation may differ from memory of other emotionally arousing
reputations (Bell et al., 2012b), we do not know whether memory
for cooperative events is enhanced relative to memory for other
events. This study aims to investigate whether Stevens et al. (2011)
tapped specialized, domain-specific memory abilities for events.
We investigated this in two ways. First, we explored whether
cooperative situations enhance memory relative to other, neutral
situations. Though people remember social information better
than non-social information (Mesoudi et al., 2006), it is not
clear whether they remember cooperative contexts better than
non-cooperative contexts. We created two memory contexts. One
context replicated Stevens et al.’s (2011) cooperative memory task,
where participants had to recall a partner’s cooperation or defection. The other context simply had participants track whether
each partner read a newspaper or not each day. Better memory
performance in the cooperative context would indicate that cooperative situations trigger domain-specific memory mechanisms.
Second, we explored whether memory performance in Stevens
et al. (2011) was rather poor because the cooperative memory
task did not properly trigger the relevant cooperative memory
mechanisms because there was no strategic component to the
task. To enhance the strategic nature of the task, we varied how
participants were paid based on whether the correct answer was
a “positive” action (cooperate or read newspaper) or “negative”
action (not cooperate or not read newspaper). Our standard
payoff scheme paid participants 5 cents when they were correct
and nothing if they were incorrect, replicating Stevens et al.
(2011). Our costly payoff scheme (1) provided differential payoffs depending on whether the correct answer was positive or
negative and (2) allowed for losses not just gains. Therefore, in
the costly payoff scheme, errors are differentially costly, depending on what is remembered. According to error management
theory (Haselton and Buss, 2000), people should minimize the
most costly error. Because forgetting defection (and not reading
the newspaper) is more costly than forgetting cooperation (and
reading the newspaper), this mirrors the strategic aspects of the
prisoner’s dilemma in which cooperating against a defector yields
the lowest payoff in the game. Therefore, in the cooperative but
not neutral context, better memory in the costly payoff scheme
compared to the standard scheme would indicate that adding a
strategic component is needed to trigger domain-specific cooperative memory. If memory is better in the costly compared to
standard scheme in both the cooperative and neutral contexts,
this would indicate that the costs of mistakes drive performance,
not strategic cooperation.

Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org

A key finding from Stevens et al. (2011) is that memory performance decreased with larger groups of simulated partners. That
study, however, used the group’s sizes of only 5–15 individuals,
much smaller than the estimated sizes of actual social networks
(Hill and Dunbar, 2003). The social brain or social intelligence
hypothesis predicts that cognitive abilities should reflect the
level of social complexity experienced by individuals (Jolly, 1966;
Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1992). This
is typically evaluated by correlating traits across species. For
example, Dunbar (1992) showed that primate species that live in
larger groups have larger relative brain size (neocortex volume
relative to rest of brain volume).
Though the social intelligence hypothesis is primarily an evolutionary hypothesis meant to account for species differences in
cognition, it may also apply to individual differences in cognition.
This would predict a relationship between an individual’s cognitive abilities and his or her functional social network size. Since
memory is an important cognitive constraint on cooperation, the
social intelligence hypothesis predicts that memory performance
should correlate with social network size across individuals. Stiller
and Dunbar (2007) found that, in fact, memory accuracy for facts
did correlate with social network size. We expect this to carry
over to cooperative memory situations, as well. Those individuals who have good memories are able to remember cooperation
and defection from a larger group of partners. To investigate this
prediction, we measured social network sizes of our participants
and correlated them with their memory performance.

1.4. This Study

We investigated the domain specificity of cooperative memory
and the social intelligence hypothesis by using a cooperative
memory task that replicated the methods of Stevens et al. (2011).
We varied the context (cooperation/neutral) and payoff scheme
(standard/costly) to explore the domain specificity of cooperative
memory. We measured the relationship between memory and
social network size to explore the social intelligence hypothesis.

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
We conducted two experiments for this study. The first experiment varied context and payoff scheme. The second experiment
aimed to replicate only the observed correlation between memory
and social network size.

2.1. Experiment 1
2.1.1. Participants

We recruited 80 participants (39 males and 41 females) with a
mean ± SD age of 25.8 ± 4.2 (range 18–36) years from German
Universities via the Max Planck Institute for Human Development
participant pool from January to February 2011. Due to technical problems, the sample was restricted to 48 participants (see
below). Participants earned 5 EUR for showing up plus an average of 8.88 EUR (approximately 12.16 USD in 2011) per person
(range = 1.60–15.55 EUR) based on their performance. This
project was approved by the Max Planck Institute for Human
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Development Ethics Commission, and all participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.

the skewed base rates. Therefore, we removed from the analysis
participants whose mean proportion of choices (aggregated
across all partners) was lower than 0.4 and higher than 0.6
for either experimental condition. We chose these boundaries
(before analyzing the data) because they are reasonably close
to the truly random value of 0.5. Also, when viewing the data,
there are natural breakpoints in the distributions at these values
(Figure S2 in Supplementary Material).
After viewing all members of the group, participants began
the retrieval rounds, with a randomized order of partners in
each round. We presented the image of the partners, along with
the question “What did [name] do last time?” The participant
had 10 s to answer by pressing buttons on the keyboard. If they
responded within 10 s, they received a feedback screen for 3 s
stating whether they were correct, the amount of money they
received for that trial (only if they were correct), and an updated
total amount received so far in the experiment. If they failed to
respond in time, the participant did not receive feedback, only
a reminder to respond more quickly next time. After the feedback screen, participants viewed the new action of the current
partner for 5 s before advancing to the next partner. In between
rounds, participants could pause the program and start a new
round at their discretion. Afterward, participants completed a
questionnaire asking what kinds of strategies they used to solve
the memory task, how often they guessed, and how often they
thought the partners cooperated.

2.1.2. Materials and Procedures

This study replicated Stevens et al. (2011), so the same methods and descriptions of methods are given here. All materials
were prepared in German (translated into English here). The
experiment was programmed in E-prime experimental software
(Schneider et al., 2002). The first part of the experiment collected
demographic information from the participants (sex, age, educational level, occupation, and college major). For the remainder
of the experiment, participants engaged in a memory task in
which they viewed simulated partners, and they were asked to
recall each partner’s previous action (Stevens et al., 2011). Before
beginning the experiment, participants received a paper copy of
instructions describing the goal of the task: recall the last action
for each simulated player (participant instructions are available
in the Supplementary Material).
A practice phase familiarized participants with the experiment. The practice phase was identical to the actual experimental
session, except the following: (1) it used fewer trials in a fixed
order for all participants (three partners with four interactions
each and six partners with three interactions each), (2) it included
only female partners (the experimental phases included only
male partners), and (3) the money earned did not accumulate for
the final payment. At the end of the practice session, participants
received feedback concerning their success (“You have accomplished the practice session with x out of 21 correct answers.”).
Simulated partners included a photograph of an individual
and a name (Figure S1 in Supplementary Material). For the
photographs of partners, we used images from Ebner (2008)
downloaded from the MPI for Human Development FACES
Collection (retrieved from http://faces.mpib-berlin.mpg.de on
21 March 2011). We used 9 images of females for the practice
phase and 20 images of males for the experimental phase. The
depicted persons ranged between 18 and 32 years old, with
the same background and color of clothing (Ebner, 2008). For
partner names, we used 20 of the most common male German
names from 1958 to 2000 (retrieved from http://www.gfds.de/
vornamen/beliebteste-vornamen/ on 21 March 2011).
Each session consisted of a series of rounds. Participants
met with each of 10 partners once in a randomized order per
round. In the initial round, we presented individually for
each partner an image, a name, and an action: for instance,
“Klaus cooperates” or “Ulrich reads the newspaper” (Figure
S1 in Supplementary Material). We randomly assigned partner
names and images across participants. Participants viewed
each partner’s information for 5 s before advancing to the
next partner (1 s in between partners). For every trial in the
experimental phase, we randomly assigned the partner’s action
as cooperate or defect, so participants could not associate a
pattern of action with each partner and had to track the exact
behavior of each partner in the previous round. Due to technical problems, however, partner choices were not completely
random for 32 participants. Non-random partner choices could
allow participants to perform better than chance just by using
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2.1.3. Experimental Conditions

We manipulated two within-subjects experimental conditions
and one between-subjects experimental condition, leading to a
2 × 2 × 2 experimental design. The first within-subjects manipulation varied the context experienced by the participant. The
cooperative context condition replicated Stevens et al. (2011) by
having partners either cooperate or not cooperate. To introduce
the idea of cooperation, participants first read the following text:
You are supposed to prepare two-person presentations
for a high school class together with different partners.
In the end, you and your partner will receive the same
mark. Each of your partners can now decide: either he
will invest time and effort and cooperate or he leaves
you alone with the preparations and does not cooperate.
The participant then began the practice trials for that condition, tracking the cooperative actions of their partners. In the
neutral context condition, rather than tracking cooperation,
participants tracked a neutral action that involved no strategic
components. In other words, the partner actions did not
influence the participant. Before beginning this condition, the
participants read the following text:
You come in contact with different people. They repeatedly decide whether they want to read a newspaper
this morning over breakfast or not.
All participants experienced 10 rounds of each condition (one
initial round observing actions and nine recall rounds), with
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for showing up plus an average of 3.35 USD (range = 2.15–4.65
USD) per person based on their performance. This project was
approved by the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Internal Review
Board (IRB# 20160316008), and all participants gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.

the order counterbalanced across participants (alternating with
subject number) and evenly divided between sexes.
The second within-subjects manipulation varied the partner’s
action. We defined positive actions as cooperating and reading
the newspaper and negative actions as not cooperating and not
reading the newspaper. For each trial, the computer program
randomly chose the positive or negative action with equal probability. Therefore, we could examine whether the type of partner
action influenced memory accuracy.
The between-subjects manipulation varied the payoff scheme
offered to the participants (Table 1). The standard payoff scheme
was identical to that used in Stevens et al. (2011) in which participants received 5 euro cents if they answered correctly and 0 euro
cents if they answered incorrectly, regardless of the correct answer.
In the costly payoff scheme, the payoffs for correct and incorrect
answers depended on the correct answer (Table 1). That is, if the
partner action was positive (cooperate or read the newspaper),
then the participant received 10 euro cents for correct answers
and 0 euro cents for incorrect answers. If the partner action was
negative (not cooperate or not read the newspaper), then correct answers yielded 5 cents and incorrect answers resulted in
losing 5 cents. We counterbalanced which condition participants
experienced (alternating with participant number), and evenly
divided conditions between sexes.

2.2.2. Materials and Procedures

This experiment replicated the methods of Experiment 1 but
only with the cooperation scenario using the standard payoff
scheme. Participants experienced 11 interactions with each
of 10 hypothetical partners. Because this was an American
population, we used 29 of the most popular male names in the
U.S. during the 1990s (when the participants were born) from
the U.S. Social Security Administration (https://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/babynames/ retrieved on 4 April 2016). We also used 29
images of neutral male faces and 3 images of neutral female faces
(for practice trials) from the Umeå University Database of Facial
Expressions (Samuelsson et al., 2012).

2.2.3. Questionnaire

After the memory task, we asked participants about their social
network. Instead of estimating contacts, Facebook friends, etc.,
we had participants list the initials of everyone with whom they
had some kind of social contact in the last 30 days (Lewis et al.,
2011). We used this number of contacts as our measure of social
network size. We then collected demographic data, such as
gender and age.

2.1.4. Questionnaire

After the memory task, participants completed a questionnaire
in which we asked them whether they knew any of the people in
the photographs, how often they guessed, what types of strategies
they used to solve the task, and task motivation. We also asked
participants how many friends they had in social networking
websites (such as Facebook) and how many family members,
close friends, acquaintances, work colleagues, and neighbors they
had. We summed all of these contacts as our measure of social
network size. The questionnaire is available in the Supplementary
Material.

2.3. Data Analysis

We conducted a binomially distributed generalized linear mixed
model (GLMM) with memory accuracy as the binary response
variable (0 for incorrect and 1 for correct). We included context
(cooperation or neutral) and the partner’s previous action
(cooperate/read newspaper or defect/did not read newspaper)
as within-subjects variables and payoff scheme (standard or
costly) as a between-subjects variable. For between-subjects
comparisons, we calculated standard 95% confidence intervals;
for within-subjects comparisons, we calculated within-subjects
95% confidence intervals (Morey, 2008); and for mixed-effects
models, we calculated profile likelihood confidence intervals
for coefficients (Venzon and Moolgavkar, 1988). Confidence
intervals are presented in brackets after the parameter estimate.
In addition to frequentist statistics, we calculated Bayes factors (BF) to provide the weight of evidence for the alternative
hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis (Wagenmakers, 2007).
For example, BF = 10 means that the evidence for the alternative hypothesis is 10 times stronger than the evidence for the
null hypothesis. Bayes factors between 0.33 and 3 provide only
anecdotal evidence, those between 0.1–0.33 and 3–10 provide
moderate evidence, those between 0.01–0.1 and 10–100 provide
strong evidence, and those below 0.01 or above 100 provide very
strong evidence (Wagenmakers et al., in press). Bayes factors associated with GLMMs were converted from Bayesian Information
BICnull − BICalternative
2
(Wagenmakers, 2007).
Criterion (BIC) using BF = e
Alternative models for main effects included only the main effect
of interest and the random subject effect. Alternative models for

2.2. Experiment 2
2.2.1. Participants

Experiment 2 was a replication study in which we focused on
cooperative memory and social network size. We tested 80 participants (30 males, 48 females, and 2 others) with a mean ± SD
age of 20.4 ± 1.4 (range 19–25) years from the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology undergraduate
participant pool in April 2016. Participants earned course credit

TABLE 1 | Payoff schemes.
a. Standard payoff condition

Correct response
Incorrect response

Positive action

Negative action

5 cents
0 cents

5 cents
0 cents

10 cents
0 cents

5 cents
−5 cents

b. Costly payoff condition
Correct response
Incorrect response
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interactions included the interaction of the two main effects and
the random subject effect. Null models for main effects included
only the random subject effect, and null models for interactions
included the two main effects (without the interaction) and the
random effect of subject. All other Bayes factors were computed
using non-informative (Bayesian t-test) or weakly informative
(Bayesian regression/ANOVA) priors (Rouder et al., 2009;
Rouder and Morey, 2012).
We analyzed the data using R Statistical Software version
3.4.1 (R Core Team, 2017) and the BayesFactor (Morey and
Rouder, 2015), cowplot (Wilke, 2016), dplyr (Wickham and
Francois, 2016), ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016), lme4 (Bates et al.,
2015), papaja (Aust and Barth, 2017), plyr (Wickham, 2011),
and tidyr (Wickham, 2017) packages. Data, R code, and supplementary figures are available in the Supplementary Material
and at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/zcv4m/). The
manuscript was created using rmarkdown (Allaire et al., 2017)
and knitr (Xie, 2015), and the reproducible research materials
are available from author JRS and at https://osf.io/zcv4m/.

events on memory showed similar decreases (with different
intercepts) for all data sets (Figure 1). Thus, the data from these
experiments broadly replicated Stevens et al. (2011).

3.2. Payoff Scheme and Context

For Experiment 1, we conducted a binomial GLMM using
memory accuracy as a dependent variable, payoff scheme as a
between-subjects variable, and context and partner action as
within-subjects variables. Participants remembered 81.5% [77.3,
85.6] of the actions in the standard payoff scheme and 80.8%
[76.4, 85.2] in the costly scheme, providing strong evidence that
accuracy did not differ between payoff schemes (β = 0.08 [−0.36,
0.52], BF = 0.01; Figure 2A).
Participants remembered 80.9% [78.2, 83.6] of the actions
in the cooperation context and 81.4% [78.7, 84.0] in the neutral
context, providing strong evidence that accuracy did not differ
across context (β = 0.26 [0.04, 0.47], BF = 0.01; Figure 2B).
Therefore, participants remembered partner actions equally
independent of payoff scheme or context.

3. RESULTS

3.3. Partner Action Type

For Experiment 1, participants remembered 79.2% [76.4, 81.9]
of the partners’ positive actions (cooperate/read newspaper)
and 83.0% [80.3, 85.7] of their negative actions (defect/did not
read newspaper), which was very strong evidence for a difference between the two partner action types (β = 0.51 [0.28, 0.73],
BF > 100; Figure 3). There was strong evidence for no interaction between partner action type and payoff scheme (β = −0.15
[−0.47, 0.17], BF = 0.06) and no evidence for an interaction
between partner action type and context (β = −0.26 [−0.58,
0.07], BF = 0.56). Therefore, participants remembered defection
better than cooperation across the two payoff schemes, but they
also remembered not reading a newspaper better than reading a
newspaper.

3.1. Replication of Stevens et al. (2011)

The overall memory accuracies (collapsed across all conditions)
from Experiment 1 (mean ± SD = 81.2 ± 10.3%) compared with
those of Stevens et al. (2011) (77.5 ± 10.5%) showed no evidence
of a difference (mean difference [95% CI] = 3.7% [−1.2, 8.7],
Cohen’s d = 0.35, BF = 0.64). Experiment 2, however, resulted in
lower accuracies (67.1 ± 12.2%) than Stevens et al. (2011) (mean
difference = 10.5% [6.8, 14.1], Cohen’s d = 0.86, BF > 100) and
Experiment 1 (mean difference = 14.2% [9.1, 19.2], Cohen’s
d = 1.17, BF > 100). The effect of the number of intervening

3.4. Social Network Size

For Experiment 1, there was no evidence for memory accuracy
correlating with social network size (r46 = 0.09, BF = 0.34);
however, these data included outliers (Figure 4A). As an
exploratory analysis, we removed the two data points with high
Z-scores (greater than 3.5) and high leverage. The trimmed data
showed moderate evidence for a positive relationship between
memory accuracy and social network size (r44 = 0.35, BF = 3.20;
Figure 4B).
The replication study (Experiment 2) tested a different group
of participants and used an alternative measure of social network
size that recorded the number of individuals that participants
encountered in the last 30 days. This confirmatory data set replicated the moderate positive relationship between memory accuracy and social network size (r78 = 0.32, BF = 9.17; Figure 4C).
Note that non-informative priors were used to estimate this
Bayes factor, so this value is independent of the analysis from
Experiment 1 (i.e., we did not use the posterior distribution
from Experiment 1 as the priors for Experiment 2). Therefore,
individuals with larger social networks remembered better than
those with smaller networks.

FIGURE 1 | Effect of number of intervening events on memory accuracy.
Memory accuracy decreased as the number of intervening events increased.
Data from Stevens et al. (2011) used comparable parameter values as
Experiments 1 and 2 (10 partners and 10 interactions per partner).
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FIGURE 2 | Effect of payoff scheme and context on memory accuracy. (A) Memory accuracy did not differ between the standard and costly payoff scheme.
(B) Memory accuracy did not differ between the cooperation and neutral context. Circles represent means, error bars represent between-subjects confidence
intervals, horizontal bars represent medians, boxes represent interquartile ranges, and whiskers represent full ranges.

decreasing with the number of intervening events (Figure 1).
To investigate whether a more strategic payoff situation induces
better memory than standard payoffs, we made forgetting defection costly and correctly remembering cooperation more valuable
than remembering defection (Table 1). Despite this difference in
payoffs, participants exhibited the same memory accuracy levels
(Figure 2A). To investigate whether cooperative contexts induce
better memory than neutral contexts, we provided contexts
framed as either cooperative or not cooperative (recalling whether
a partner read a newspaper). Participants did not differ in their
memory accuracy levels between the two contexts (Figure 2B).
Finally, we found that memory accuracy did positively correlate
with number of social contacts in two experiments (Figure 4).
Thus, we did not find evidence of cooperative memory being
special, but we did demonstrate a relationship between cooperative memory and social network size.
FIGURE 3 | Effect of payoff scheme and context on memory accuracy.
Memory accuracy was higher following a partner’s cooperation than his
defection for both standard and costly payoff schemes. Data are aggregated
across both context types. Circles represent means, error bars represent
within-subjects confidence intervals, horizontal bars represent medians,
boxes represent interquartile ranges, and whiskers represent full ranges.

4.1. Is Cooperation Special?

A potential criticism of Stevens et al.’s (2011) experiment is that
the memory task did not engage purported cooperation-specific
cognition because there was no strategic component. To address
this, we included a condition with a payoff structure that mirrored a prisoner’s dilemma payoff scheme, where the reward for
correctly remembering cooperation was enhanced and the cost to
forgetting defection was enhanced such that the participants lost
money. This created a signal detection problem with differential
costs for false alarms and misses. If individuals minimize the total
number of errors committed, there should be no difference between
the payoff schemes. If individuals maximize expected value, there
should be no difference between remembering cooperation
and defection for the standard payoff scheme, but a bias toward
remembering cooperation in the costly scheme. If individuals are
minimizing risk (most costly error), there should be no difference

4. DISCUSSION
Our aims in this study were to (1) replicate findings of Stevens
et al. (2011), (2) determine whether more strategic payoff situations induce better memory than standard payoffs, (3) determine
whether cooperative contexts induce better memory than neutral
contexts, and (4) assess whether memory accuracy positively correlates with number of social contacts. In general, our findings
replicated those of Stevens et al. (2011) with memory accuracy
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FIGURE 4 | Relationship between number of contacts and memory accuracy. (A) Using all data in Experiment 1, there was no evidence for a relationship between
number of contacts and memory accuracy. (B) Removing the two outliers showed a moderate positive relationship between number of contacts and memory
accuracy. (C) Experiment 2 replicated the finding that memory accuracy positively correlated with number of contacts. Gray bands represent point-wise confidence
intervals.

between remembering cooperation and defection for the standard
scheme, but a bias toward remembering defectors in the costly
scheme. Our results show a bias for remembering defection better
than cooperation, but it applies to both the standard and costly
payoff schemes (Figure 3). This contradicts the predictions of signal detection theory because the payoff schemes differed in their
costs, which should influence performance. Despite contradicting
the theories, these results align with many other tests of signal
detection theory, where participants ignore costs of errors when
detecting signals among noise (Bohil and Maddox, 2001; Lynn
and Barrett, 2014).
Signal detection theory does not specify the mechanism by
which detection thresholds are set; it only provides optimal solutions to detection problems. The assumption, however, is that
individuals are learning about the probability of the different
states of the world (in our case, partners cooperating or defecting)
and the costs and benefits of errors and accurate judgments.
Thus, within a session, participants should adjust to the probabilities and payoffs. We did not find this when aggregating over
the entire experimental session. As an exploratory analysis, we
tested memory accuracy for cooperation and defection for only
the cooperation context as a function of payoff scheme for the last
40 trials per condition but found the same results.
Though a learning-based interpretation of signal detection
theory pre
dicts sensitivity to payoffs over the course of an
experiment, error management theory (Haselton and Buss,
2000) does not. Rather, error management theory predicts that
natural selection is the mechanism that sets detection thresholds.
That is, detection thresholds must have some genetic basis, and
individuals whose thresholds provide fitness benefits are more
likely to pass on those genetic predispositions to their offspring.
Therefore, detection thresholds may not be dynamic under this
theory. They may be set to values that provide overall benefits.
The fact that participants remembered defectors better than
cooperators supports the error management theory prediction of
thresholds that minimize the most costly error. This result also
aligns with other work demonstrating preferential memory for
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defectors over cooperation (Buchner et al., 2009). Nevertheless,
the lack of a difference between the two payoff schemes suggests
that making the Stevens et al. (2011) experimental situation more
strategic did not trigger special cognition for remembering
cooperative situations.
One possible explanation for the failure of the payoff scheme
to influence memory accuracy is that the original task by Stevens
et al. (2011) already triggered the cooperation-specific cognitive
mechanisms, so accuracy was at ceiling for both payoff schemes.
If this is the case, then we would expect participants to perform
better in the cooperation context compared to the neutral context. Yet, we found no difference in performance between these
contexts. Even the effect of better memory of defection appears
in both cooperative and neutral contexts. This is unexpected
because there is no a priori reason to remember that someone did
not read a newspaper better than remembering that they did read
a newspaper. One possibility is that people remember negative
events (not cooperating and not reading a newspaper) better than
positive ones as is observed with words and images (RobinsonRiegler and Winton, 1996; Ito et al., 1998; Baumeister et al., 2001).
This negativity bias may apply across domains. Combined with
the lack of a difference between payoff schemes, these results
indicate that memory for cooperative events is domain general
and does not differ from non-cooperative contexts or more
strategic cooperative situations. This aligns with previous work
demonstrating the generality of memory beyond cooperation
(Bell and Buchner, 2010; Bell et al., 2015).

4.2. Social Network Size

We found that individual social network size correlated with
memory for actions. This corroborates another finding that
social network size correlated with memory for facts (Stiller
and Dunbar, 2007). Our results support the social intelligence
hypothesis that predicts a relationship between cognition and
social group size. Interestingly, these results also suggest that this
is not just an evolutionary hypothesis about species differences.
Our results indicate that this relationship holds across individuals
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within a species, as well. Further, recent work has explored the
neural basis for these individual differences and has reported
correlations between network size and brain region size/density
(Bickart et al., 2011; Lewis et al., 2011; Kanai et al., 2012; Powell
et al., 2012), activity (Von Der Heide et al., 2014), and connectivity (Bickart et al., 2012; Hampton et al., 2016).
The social intelligence hypothesis, however, is agnostic to
whether group size limits cognition or whether cognition allows
expansion of group size. Constraints on cognition for an individual may limit the social network size in which he or she may
function. Alternatively, interacting in larger social networks may
facilitate enhanced cognition. Though the direction of causation can probably work both ways, there is evidence in rhesus
macaques that social network size can drive brain size (Sallet et al.,
2011). Researchers experimentally housed macaques in groups of
different sizes and found that both gray matter and brain region
connectivity increased with group size. This result has important
implications for our findings. It implies that, over the course
of an individual’s lifetime, the exposure to a complicated social
environment (large social network) can drive changes in brain
region size and connectivity. These neural enhancements may
expand cognitive abilities for individuals in large social networks.
Memory may not be so much of a constraint on social network
size. Rather, the social environment may actually shape cognition. Thus, engaging in social interactions with many partners
may improve memory for cooperative actions.

used the costly payoff scheme to mimic a prisoner’s dilemma.
Nevertheless, including direct cooperative interactions would
further increase the external validity of these results.
This was a fairly fast-paced memory experiment. Participants
had 10 s to recall and choose a partner action, 5 s of exposure
to new partner actions, and 1 s between partners. Of course,
this interaction rate does not match natural interaction patterns
that people experience. Decision time, encoding time, and time
between interactions were greatly accelerated in this experiment.
Similarly, this experiment lacked key emotional components of
actual cooperation situations. However, this experiment was not
designed to test which cognitive and emotional component are
used in actual cooperative behavior. Rather, this experiment and
Stevens et al. (2011) were designed to test whether humans have
the memory abilities to implement tit-for-tat-like strategies. TFT
is agnostic on the pace of interaction or the presence of emotional
input. This study in particular aimed to see if the results in Stevens
et al. (2011) were robust to changes in the cooperative situation,
by attempting to both enhance and reduce memory for cooperation. Both efforts failed, suggesting that cooperative memory is
not special. We do not have the memory abilities to implement
tit-for-tat-like strategies.
Humans do not accurately remember specific cooperative
actions. We do, however, remember overall partner impressions
(Volstorf et al., 2011). That is, though we do not track individual
actions (cooperating or defecting), we do integrate a series of
actions into an overall impression and remember these impressions (cooperator or defector) over time. We argue that focusing
on tit-for-tat-like strategies has provided important insights into
the evolution of cooperation. But these strategies are simply
not cognitively plausible. We recommend that modeling efforts
redirect to strategies that more accurately reflect how humans
and other animals actually process and remember information.
We advocate a switch from action-based to impression-based
strategies. These strategies should incorporate not only personal
experience but also third-party observation of reputation. The
reputation perspective already has a modeling history (Boyd
and Richerson, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Leimar and
Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Roberts,
2008), and incorporating personal experience impressions could
provide important insights and yield a parsimonious model of
cooperation. Critically, this research program takes the psychology of the decision maker seriously, satisfying Simon’s (1955)
notion of bounded rationality. The modeling world has carefully
investigated how the environment influences cooperation. But to
truly resolve the puzzle of cooperation, we must understand the
cognition of the decision makers.

4.3. Limitations and Conclusion

One limitation of our method is that the measures of social network
size involve memory (recalling the number of Facebook friends
and recalling individual people in their social networks). Thus, to
some extent, memory is intertwined with our measure of network
size. More direct measures of network size (e.g., experimenters
directly viewing Facebook accounts or using experienced-based
sampling of social networks) can avoid this issue in future work.
In Experiment 1, our technical problems reduced our sample
size from 80 to 48 participants. Though the smaller sample size
reduced our power, the sample size was still large enough to
provide strong evidence supporting the null hypothesis of no
difference between payoff scheme conditions or contexts. Thus,
the Bayesian statistics give us confidence to accept the null
hypotheses of no difference.
We observed differences between our German and American
populations of participants. The error rates observed in our
German population matched those of the Stevens et al. (2011)
data, which were drawn from a similar German population.
The American participants exhibited higher error rates than the
German participants. Nevertheless, even with a lower accuracy
rate, the American population replicated the positive relationship
between number of social contacts and memory accuracy.
In terms of the experimental design, like Stevens et al. (2011),
this study presented hypothetical actions of hypothetical partners. Ideally, participants should be engaged in actual cooperative
interactions with real partners. Due to the difficulty of simultaneously incentivizing both cooperative interactions and accurate
memory recall, we opted to incentivize only memory recall. To
make the task more realistic from a strategic perspective, we
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